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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bank of Cochin, Ltd. (Cochin) (issuing bank) sued Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Company1 (MHT) (confirming bank) be-
cause MHT honored drafts totalling $796,603.50 under a letter of
credit, alleging that the accompanying documents did not conform
to the letter of credit which required, inter alia, six copies of
signed invoices (five were presented) and an advice of insurance
referring to covernote 429711 (the advice referred to 4291).' Fur-
ther, the draft named "St. Lucia Enterprises" as the payee and not
the beneficiary, St. Lucia Enterprises, Ltd.3 As is quite often the
case, the charge of wrongful honor was made because the benefi-
ciary and the money are gone. The goods were never sent; all of the
documents presented to MHT were fraudulent. As the district
court said, it "must decide whose shoulders will bear the scam."'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York on cross motions, granted MHT's motion for summary
judgment," holding: The missing sixth invoice was a "deviation"
not a defect, being a type of "variance" that could not mislead the
paying bank to its detriment and thus did not violate the rule that
documents must strictly conform to a letter of credit. Further,
while the mis-numbering and the inaccurate payee of the draft
were defects, not "complying" with the letter of credit's "condi-
1. 612 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
2. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1535. The credit as finally amended required the following:
sight drafts; six copies of signed invoices; a set of clean, shipped, on-board bills of lading; a
west European origin certificate; an analysis certificate; shipment from a west European
port to Bombay; a maritime insurance certificate (covernote 429711); a packing list in tripli-
cate; a set of non-negotiable documents to be sent to the customer; a confirming cable;
Lloyd's or the shipping company's certificate that the carrying ship was first class or ap-
proved non-Pakistani; the beneficiary's certificate of compliance with the letter of credit
terms; shipment by May 31, 1980; and June 15, 1980 expiration. Id.; Joint Appendix to
Briefs of Parties at A-28 to A-34, Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
3. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1535.
4. Id. at 1534.
5. Id. at 1533.
6. Id. at 1541.
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tions,"' Cochin was estopped from "claiming wrongful honor be-
cause of its failure to comply with the explicit notice and affirma-
tive obligation provisions of the U.C.P. and its implicit duty to
promptly cure discoverable defects in MHT's confirming advices to
St. Lucia."" That MHT was not harmed by Cochin's failure was
seen to be immaterial because Cochin ignored financial custom and
expectations, and its acts were "at odds with the basic letter of
credit tenet that banks deal in documents, not in goods . . . [and
its acts] [dlefeat the letter of credit's function of being a swift,
fluid and reliable financing device."9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on review of the Bank of Cochin's
appeal affirmed the district court's judgment, holding: Cochin was
estopped from asserting the documentary defects because it
delayed in specifying the defects. Further, "Cochin's two-week de-
lay in notifying MHT of its intent to return the documents pre-
clude[d the] suit." Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hano-
ver Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 1986).
While this Comment addresses issues concerning how best to
satisfy the commercial needs of the parties under letter of credit
arrangements, it is important to keep in mind the threat to the
letter of credit devise posed by sophisticated fraud by beneficiaries
like St. Lucia. Strict compliance and independence will not protect
the buyer who finds himself dealing with a con man. The mechan-
istic approach to a bank's duty under letters of credit is viable only
if the documents represent goods. Where no one can be sure of
documents, they cannot serve as the basis for commercial transac-
tions. The parties will find themselves back with the necessity of
face-to-face dealing.'
This Comment outlines the basis of the concept of requiring
strict compliance of documents presented under a letter of credit
coupled with the practical necessity of complete independence of
letter of credit liability and duty from commercial forces. The
Comment goes on to identify the complimentary body of law pro-
tecting the parties associated with a letter of credit, then analyzes
the district court and Second Circuit Cochin decisions, concluding
that their analysis is unnecessary, misguided, and potentially dam-
7. Id. at 1540, 1541.
8. Id. at 1542.
9. Id. at 1543.
10. See infra Part II B. The increasing sophistication of electronic money and informa-
tion transfer systems may provide an answer to the paper problem.
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aging to the commercial viability of the letter of credit device.
II. HISTORICAL BASIS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE
A. Dawson Partners
In 1927 Lord, then Viscount, Sumner said: "There is no room
for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as
well."11 The next sentences are equally important:
Business could not proceed securely on any other lines. The
bank's branch abroad, which knows nothing officially of the de-
tails of the transaction thus financed, cannot take upon itself to
decide what will do well enough and what will not. If it does as
it is told, it is safe; if it declines to do anything else, it is safe; if
it departs from the conditions laid down, it acts at its own risk.
The documents tendered were not exactly the documents which
the defendants had promised to take up, and prima facie they
were right in refusing to take them.1 2
Dawson Partners had bought 3000 kilos of vanilla beans for
£8,300. The contract with the seller required that it establish a let-
ter of credit in favor of the seller as beneficiary. The credit, as
amended, required that drafts be accompanied by, inter alia, a
quality certificate issued by "experts who are sworn brokers."'
The requirement, transmitted by the issuing bank to the benefi-
ciary, was translated from code as an "expert who is a sworn bro-
ker." ' The beneficiary in the course of his fraud, presented one
broker's certificate, not the two required by the credit. The issuing
bank negotiated and paid the draft as presented with the non-con-
forming document. Dawson Partners refused to accept the docu-
ments. The issuing bank sued.1 5 After dealing with an agency ques-
tion the House of Lords dismissed the issuing bank's appeal. Lord
Atkinson characterized the bank's argument in his opinion as
follows:
It is suggested ... that this conduct of [Dawson Partners] was
rather grasping, inconsiderate and ungenerous. I express no
11. Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, Ltd., 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 49, 52 (H.L.
1927).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 49.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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opinion on that point; it may be so, but I do venture to express a
confident opinion that [its] action was legally justifiable, and
that is the business of Courts of law to enforce legal rights
• .. [The bank's argument that Dawson partners should have
consented to one instead of two experts is unavailing, it] never
consented . . .[it was] not under any obligation to do so.'
Both members of the House of Lords, while discussing the
commercial transaction, motivation, and the business basis for the
credit term, refused to go behind the clear requirement of the let-
ter of credit. Dawson Partners, however picayune, intransigent,
and ungentlemanly, engaged the bank to obtain the certificate of
two experts. Absent legal excuse, an issuing bank must fulfill its
ministerial function or suffer the legal consequences.
B. Commercial Context
Dawson Partners while taking a highly mechanistic, formalis-
tic approach was not acting in a vacuum. To the contrary, its insis-
tence on extreme independence of the bank's duty from the com-
mercial setting facilitated "the letter of credit's function of being a
swift, fluid and reliable financing device. 1 7
16. Id. at 55.
17. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1543. Some commentators and courts, including, appar-
ently, the Cochin district court, see different relationships needing different rules for coM-
pliance and independence. They would look at the rights and liabilities between a customer
and issuing bank differently than they would view the relation between an issuing bank and
a confirming bank, and again differently, where the dispute arises without the presence of a
confirming bank, between an issuing bank and a beneficiary. See infra note 43 and sources
cited therein. This Comment rejects a situational approach to letter of credit law and in-
stead recommends use of the view set forth in Dawson Partners, 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 49
(H.L. 1927) and amplified by the commentators following. Harfield finds the rule of strict
conformity to be inevitable from the point of view of the customer, issuing bank, confirming
bank, and the beneficiary. Harfield, Who Does What to Whom: The Letter-of-Credit Mech-
anism, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 291, 295-96 (1985)("[Tlhe cardinal rules, when analyzed, [are] based
upon plain common sense."); L. SARNA, LETTERs OF CREDIT, THE LAW AND CURRENT PRACTICE
79 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter L. SARNA]("The banker is neither a lawyer nor a merchant and
cannot be expected to make commercial judgments on the effect of documents submitted on
the basis of information or knowledge extraneous to the documents." The book deals with
letters of credit in an international context but is written by a Canadian author and high-
lights Canadian statutes and cases.); Note, Confirming Bank Liability in Letter of Credit
Transactions: Whose Bank is it Anyway?, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1219, 1223 (1983)("Letters of
credit derive their primary utility from the principle that an issuer's duty to pay the benefi-
ciary is entirely independent of the other two contracts comprising the letter of credit trans-
action."). Discussion of a case or concept in this Comment may, in context, refer to only one
of the relationships within the overall letter of credit transaction. The rule derived should
be applied to all of the other relationships.
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There are two independent "financing" functions fulfilled by
the letter of credit. Neither can take place without certainty of
process and result. Both are symbiotic, gaining vitality from each
other.
1. The Payment Device
The letter of credit replaces the necessity of face-to-face ex-
change of goods and money, by exchanging documents of title for
money through the neutral offices of a bank or banks. The buyer in
a long distance purchase needs to be assured that he will get the
goods. Absent receipt he is unwilling to part with payment. The
seller conversely, will not give up the goods without assurance that
the money is forthcoming. The bank steps into a unique position.
It takes the "token" representing the goods and gives the payment,
in effect, simultaneously.18
2. The Credit Device
Once people are willing to accept paper to represent goods, it
is a short step to purchase of paper as having intrinsic value. "Ne-
gotiable Paper" is the "collateral" for the loan of money. The cred-
itor is assured that the goods are available to satisfy the debt
should the debtor default on his payment obligation. This credit
function can occur at both ends of the long distance commercial
transaction. The seller may "discount" the letter of credit obliga-
tion to a creditor to finance the manufacture of goods. The buyer
may sell the goods "afloat," the proceeds going to pay off a line of
credit used for the original purchase."" In short, letters of credit,
where independent and subject to strict compliance analysis, as-
sure "inexpensive" payment and financing for any type of transac-
tion envisioned by the parties.2
18. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 708-10 (2d ed. 1980)[hereinafter J. WHiTz](examples of the utility of the letter of
credit as a payment device. Chapter 18 gives an overview of United States letter of credit
law.)
19. See J. WHITE, supra note 18 (examples of the credit function).
20. Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 251,
257 (1982).
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C. Historical Solution
Both the payment and credit functions, as noted, are depen-
dant on certainty.2 Certainty is a result only when the rules are
few, simple, and independent of all other rules and relationships."
Only where the bank is barred from considering any factor other
than paper presented, and then, only where it may, by rote, com-
pare the paper to the terms of the credit for conformance can cer-
tainty of process and thus of result be ensured.
The buyer wants the goods. In addition, he wants goods that
meet the description and quality he contracted for. To this end, he
requires that certain documents be presented with the draft.1
3
Where the buyer cannot resell a product made in part from mate-
rial, for example, from Cuba,2" he requires a shipment from an-
other country. Within the unique context of the letter of credit he
uses a certificate of origin requiring origin in another country. One
might think that the law's condonation of such provincialism
should not be countenanced. What if only material of a certain
grade, type, or quality will do for the intended application or sale?
Further, what if the only country that can supply the grade needed
is the same country named in the certificate? The letter of credit's
independence and the strict compliance standard of document
presentation obviate the questions. "The right to enforce express
terms, without reference to equities, has long been recognized in
letter-of-credit law, and is essential to proper functioning of the
letter-of-credit devise."'" Only the buyer may know why he re-
quires the certificate. Where the bank and then a court second
guesses the buyer, certainty is destroyed. The buyer cannot get
what he wants by using the letter of credit.'6 He wants no inquiry
into why, and he wants administrative simplicity to reduce his cost
21. B. KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETrERS oF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS 416 (1966)[herein-
after B. KOZOLCHYK].
22. Rubenstein, The Issuer's Rights and Obligations Under a Letter of Credit, 17
U.CC. L.J. 129, 143-44 (1984)[hereinafter Rubenstein).
23. Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 130.
24. The United States will not accept goods originating in Cuba.
25. Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-of-Credit Law, 4 U.C.C. L.J. 7, 14
(1971)[hereinafter Code, Customs] (emphasis added). The author preceded the quoted sen-
tence with more colorful language: "A court of equity may properly be mindful of the ques-
tion: . . . 'whoso hath this world's good, and see his brother have need, and shutteth up his
bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?' [1 John 3:17]. Com-
mercial cases require quite different considerations; it is not appropriate for a court of law
to open its bowels of compassion in the marketplace." Id. at 13-14.
26. Cf. L. SARNA, supra note 17, at 73-80 (discussion of strict compliance).
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of obtaining goods. When courts search behind the document,
forcing the buyer to commercially justify the "condition" as "mate-
rial" or "essential," there is no utility left.2
This dilemma is not confined to the buyer. Where the bank
can dishonor because the certificate of inspection, while facially
complying, is predicated on an inadequate sample-in the buyer's
or bank's opinion-the seller's faith in the letter of credit device is
reduced. Where the seller seeks to discount the letter of credit to
pay for materials, the creditor calculates the discount based on the
certainty of the collateral, the bank's obligation to pay on proper
presentment, and the time-value of the extension of credit until
collection under the terms of the credit. Thus, the cost of credit is
directly tied to the certainty of collection on time. Where certainty
is lessened and time is lengthened, the risk and thus the discount
increases. The next time the seller seeks to peddle his "paper" let-
ter of credit, if he himself has not abandoned its promise, the cred-
itor, if he will discount at all, will charge more dearly. The buyer
pays more because of the increased credit cost and gets less. No
one is served."
Independence and strict compliance as embodied in the letter
of credit are one of law's few working examples of viable "bright
line" rules.3 0 In the typical letter of credit transaction the results
of the bright line strict compliance rule are neither over- nor
under-inclusive. All of the involved parties get certainty and eco-
27. Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frustrations, Part I, 94 BANKING L.J.
424, 427-30 (1977)[hereinafter Justice I]; Justice, Letters of Credit: Expectations and Frus-
trations, Part 11, 94 BANKING LJ. 493, 505-07 (1977)[hereinafter Justice II].
28. L. SARNA, supra note 17, at 76 ("Once the credit is in place, the issuer cannot sub-
stitute its own judgment as to what the documentary requirements or content of the credit
should be." The same must hold true of a court.). Cf. Megrah, Risk Aspects of the Irrevoca-
ble Documentary Credit, 24 AmIz. L. REv. 255, 258, 265-66 (1982). Megrah does not sub-
scribe to this Comment's view of the absolute sanctity of strict compliance, but does recog-
nize that interpretation of what is a "trifling" discrepancy creates difficulty for all concerned
and great insecurity for the customer.
29. Justice I, supra note 27, at 429-30; Justice II, supra note 27, at 505-07.
30. In speaking of independence and strict compliance, Harfield characterizes them as
doctrinal versus dogmatic and considers their maintenance as rules essential:
In a number of cases, courts have refused, explicitly or implicitly on equitable
grounds, to apply the rule . . . . Such decisions are generally found at the trial
level, and the vast majority are reversed or repudiated on appeal. They remain,
nevertheless, exceptions that endanger and may well erode the rule unless the
reason for the rule is understood . . . . fT]he rule of strict construction is prag-
matic rather than formal and is, when understood, a rule of equity as well as of
law.
Harfield, Identity Crises in Letter of Credit Law, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 239, 240 (1982).
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nomic and administrative efficiency. Where the bright line bumps
against justice, established corollary bodies of law tailor the results
to gain fairness.
D. Legal "Equity"
It is normally not necessary to go behind the terms of the let-
ter of credit, looking to the expectations of the parties, to do jus-
tice, in the individual case. The historical legal concepts of con-
tract construction, consent, estoppel, waiver, and developed letter
of credit and banking law and practice serve to tailor the parties'
duties and liabilities to reach the "right" result.
1. Duty of Clarity
Where the customer or issuing bank has not stated what it
wants so that the beneficiary or presenting bank (or in more realis-
tic terms, the court hearing the suit) can determine what should be
complied with, many courts and commentators have said that
there is no duty of strict compliance, it being a logical impossibil-
ity."1 Some of these courts see this as a corollary to the rule of
strict compliance.
31. Jean Stoufflet cites to both Lebanese and Commercial Court of Brussels' decisions
for the proposition that the customer must explicitly request a document for there to be
occasion to strictly construe what is submitted by the beneficiary. Stoufflet, Payment and
Transfer in Documentary Letters of Credit: Interaction Between the French General Law
of Obligations and the Uniform Customs and Practice, 24 Amz. L. REv. 267, 269-76 (1982);
L. SARNA, supra note 16, at 78 ("If the instructions given by the customer to the issuer as to
the documents to be tendered are ambiguous or capable of covering more than one kind of
document, the issuer is not in breach of his duty if he acts upon a reasonable meaning of the
ambiguous expression or accepts any kind of document which fairly falls within the wide
description used."). The Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits recog-
nizes the problem of ambiguity in the terms of a credit by creating interstitial definitions of
common documents and of terms found in documents and credits in Articles 14-33 (1974
revision) (Articles 22-42 in the 1983 Revision). International Chamber of Commerce Publica-
tion No. 290 (1974), No. 400 (1983)[hereinafter U.C.P., U.C.P. 1974, or U.C.P. 1983, as ap-
propriate]. The U.C.P., like the U.C.C., acts only in the absence of specific agreement by the
parties to the letter of credit. It differs from the U.C.C. in most jurisdictions in the United
States in that where adopted by the parties, it governs where it conflicts with a U.C.C.
provision. See, e.g., United States Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). Lord Shaw, in quoting Channel, J., stated,
"where a person makes a communication [ambiguously] he cannot . . . complain if the re-
cipient . . . puts upon it a meaning not intended . . . provided [the meaning is reasona-
ble]." Equitable Trust Co. v. Dawson Partners, Ltd. 27 Lloyd's List L.R. 48, 58 (H.L. 1927
(Lord Shaw) (quoting Miles v. Haalehurst, 12 Com. Cas. 83, 87 (Channel, J.)).
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2. Contract Analogue
An unclear credit term is ambiguous, and thus susceptible to
legal interpretation, and if necessary, extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine intent. Properly articulated and applied, this process could
be termed "substantial compliance." Here, commercial meaning,
practice, and custom are relevant.3 2 Where the customer has not
clearly phrased the credit, the issuing or confirming bank involved
in examination must use common sense applicable to commercial
transaction. A reviewing court will apply the same common sense
in hindsight, as informed by evidence of commercial practice and
custom."8
3. Waiver and Estoppel
Where documents do not conform and the terms are clear, but
the issuing bank or the customer acts or speaks so as to allow the
objective conclusion that it considers the deviation immaterial,
waiver and estoppel rules operate to "modify" the credit.8
4
4. Consent: In Practice and In Statute
The "problems" generated by strict compliance evidence
themselves in the marginal case. For example, the customer in his
capacity as buyer, because of a downturn in the market cannot use
any of the goods, whether they conform or not, the beneficiary
never intended to be a seller, shipping nothing, rags instead of box-
ing gloves,e or sticks instead of Java vanilla beans.36
In daily practice, banks talk to their customers and benefi-
ciaries. Where there are five copies of a document, instead of six as
required, the bank will ask for the sixth or ask the customer if he
32. H.C. GUTrERIDrGE & M. MEGRAH, THE LAW OF BANKERS' COMMERCiAL CREDITS 90
(1979)[hereinafter H.C. GurERIDnGE].
33. See supra note 31.
34. U.C.P. art. 8 (1974), and U.C.P. art. 16 (1983) operate this way. An issuing bank
must advise of its objection to the documents to preserve its rejection. Its silence or slow-
ness estops or waives non-conformity because the confirming bank and beneficiary are pre-
sumed to be acting in good faith reliance on the conformity of the documents. The cure
mechanism cannot work if the defect is not communicated. See infra note 71.
35. United States Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360
N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.C.2d 265 (1976).
36. Dawson Partners, 27 Lloyd's List L.R. at 49.
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minds only getting five. 37
The U.C.C. has formalized the bank's custom of gaining con-
sent in sections 2-323 and 5-113. While there is considerable con-
troversy as to whether the granting of an indemnity to the issuing
bank by the presenting bank for non-conforming documents works,
as currently outlined in case law and Article 5, the mechanism,
subject to revision by adjudication and statutory reform, is
viable."6
5. Negotiable Paper
Articles 3, 4, and 7 of the U.C.C., while superceded when Arti-
cle 5 treats an issue, are applicable where appropriate.3s The draft
with supporting documents can be negotiable and subject to Arti-
cle 3. Banks' dealings with each other and their customers (the let-
ter of credit's customer and beneficiary) are governed by Article 4.
Articles 7 and 9 can also apply to specific issues arising under a
letter of credit.
Understanding Harfield's observation 0 on the rules of strict
compliance and independence as functional equity devices is cru-
cial to proper adjudication of letter of credit disputes. He echoes
Lord Sumner's practical approach:"1 a bank that knows nothing of
37. L. SARNA, supra note 17, at 72. Communication among banks, customers, and bene-
ficiaries is the rule rather than the exception. Banking officials take the view that they work
for their client. While the bank may have the privilege to act unilaterally, it does not, in
practice, use it. Telephone interview with Fernando Garcia, Chief of Operations, Interna-
tional Department, Republic National Bank, Miami, Florida (Nov. 11, 1986).
38. H.C. GU7PERIDGE, supra note 32, at 151-57 (The most controversial aspects of the
giving of indemnity are the issues as to whether acceptance is mandatory and whether the
customer is bound and protected. Other sources on these issues are reported in the notes to
the cited text).
39. Article 5 of the U.C.C. states,
§ 5-111. Warranties on Transfer and Presentment
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the beneficiary by transferring or presenting a docu-
mentary draft or demand for payment warrants to all interested parties that the
necessary conditions of the credit have been complied with. This is in addition
to any warranties arising under Articles 3, 4, 7 and 8.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, a negotiating, advising, confirming, collecting or is-
suing bank presenting or transferring a draft or demand for payment under a
credit warrants only the matters warranted by a collecting bank under Article 4
and any such bank transferring a document warrants only the matters warranted
by an intermediary under Articles 7 and 8.
U.C.C. § 5-111 (1978).
40. Supra note 30.
41. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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the transaction cannot judge the equity of a credit's terms. This
separation of function precludes second guessing and is grounded
in common sense. Banks understand banking, not the myriad of
commercial relations that are facilitated by the letter of credit.
Given a duty to judge what is good enough for the fee they charge,
banks would protest.
Where the term is unclear, the rule, in common sense,
changes. Now the customer, by ambiguity, has prevented the bank
and the beneficiary from strictly complying with the terms of the
letter of credit. The bank, barring the use of a coin toss, cannot
remain independent from commercial reality. It must still act rea-
sonably, within the commercial context, but it must be judged by a
less strict standard. Contract principles and interstitial agreements
and statutes, act at this level, only where the term of the credit is
not susceptible to strict compliance, to guide the bank in its duty
to act reasonably.
Compression of this two-step process is actually inequitable
because it does not give the parties what they want-certainty by
which they can order their relationships. Ad hoc justice can be nec-
essary, but should never be a first choice. Where a court picks and
chooses which terms are essential and material and worthy of strict
compliance, as a first and only step it engages in adjudication with-
out a rule, ad hoc. Accordingly the parties expectations, under this
analysis, are only met where they match those of the court, in
hindsight.
II. COCHIN ANALYSIS
A. "Quasi-Strict" Compliance
The district court begins its analysis by surveying New York
law regarding a confirming bank's duty to require strict or only
substantial compliance of documents under a letter of credit to
prevail in a suit alleging wrongful honor instituted by an issuing
bank.2 The district court abstained from determining whether
substantial compliance should be sufficient in a suit between an
issuing bank and its customer. It apparently viewed the two rela-
tionships as potentially requiring separate rules. 8 This approach is
42. Bank of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manuf. Hanover Trust Co., 612 F. Supp. 1533, 1537-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. Boris Kozolchyk, to an extent, agrees that there are two relationships requiring dif-
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sound, if the district court's premise that there is a policy basis for
separate treatment is accepted, as a court should not decide legal
matters not implicated by the facts. Unfortunately, it is unsound
because there is no practical or legal difference between the cus-
tomer-issuing bank and issuing bank-confirming bank relationships
regarding the issue of the necessity of strict compliance and inde-
pendence of the bank's duty from the underlying transactions."
As previously noted, the concept of strict compliance is one of
law's few examples of a workable "bright-line" rule. The district
court's bifurcation is based on what it sees as a need to give the
issuing bank breathing room when its customer attempts to "avoid
payment by objecting to inconsequential defects.""8 The choice of
adjective is enlightening and will be highlighted again when the
district court refers to terms and conditions"' of a letter of credit,
material discrepancy, 7 variances,48 and deviations."
The viability of strict compliance aside, there is no difference
between a customer who seeks "inconsequential defects" and an
issuing bank that asserts those same defects in its effort to find the
confirming bank's honor to be wrongful. The district court rea-
soned that the facts of the case did not warrant a looser standard
as MHT did not have to worry about Cochin's refusal to reimburse
because the funds were already available in Cochin's account at
ferent treatment by a court. B. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 21, at §§ 13.02, 19.01. He views the
customer as being able to comb the presented documents for slight deviations to assert in
court in a manner reminiscent of the expert defense attorney examining a pleading under
the forms of action. He is wrong for several reasons. In a stable market the customer, on
consultation, will waive the non-conformity if the deviation is minor and not adverse to his
needs. In a falling market or where the goods, money, and beneficiary have disappeared,
there is no greater equity found in favoring the issuing or confirming bank that agreed to
the term, did not conform to the credit, as it had agreed to, and now wishes to wriggle out
claiming that it "substantially complied." The bank should have given itself the breathing
room it now wants when it undertook the credit. Culpability has no place in letter of credit
law. A sense of fairness cries out when the customer "stiffs" a bank that acted in good faith
in a falling market. The same sense of fairness is shaken when the beneficiary is gone with
the goods and cash because the bank did not do what it said it would do. A rule, to be
viable, must work in each marginal case. Because of the strong commercial basis for cer-
tainty, equity in its traditional usage cannot be used to favor the more innocent party. Re-
quiring strict compliance by all parties, leavened with "legal equity," Part II(D), gives eq-
uity and retains certainty, stability, administrative and economic efficiency. See Code,
Customs, supra note 25, at 13, 14, and supra note 17.
44. See supra notes 17, 43.
45. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1539.
46. Id. at 1535.
47. Id. at 1540.
48. Id. at 1539, 1541.
49. Id. at 1541.
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MHT.5 0 A rule of law should not be based on the happenstance
that the funds at stake are in the hands of the defendant. Issuing
banks do not keep accounts with all potential confirming banks.
Not all customers have the necessary funds on deposit with the
issuing bank. The district court's logic would require the use of the
substantial compliance standard in an action by a customer who
had convinced the issuing bank to extend the letter of credit based
on its promise to reimburse, often the case when there is an ongo-
ing relationship, but indicates a strict compliance standard where
the issuing bank has the customer's funds in an account. If either
the customer or the issuing bank sues to recover funds based on
wrongful honor, the rule is strict compliance. If either a confirming
bank or the issuing bank sues its customer, to force reimburse-
ment, the rule degenerates to a substantial compliance standard.
The rule left open in the district court's opinion turns on who is
suing whom. Thus, the only rationale given for a substantial com-
pliance standard is unworkable.51
After settling on what it calls a strict compliance standard for
MHT's action under the credit, the district court proceeded to ap-
ply what might be termed a "quasi-strict compliance" standard to
the terms of the credit.52 It only found those credit requirements
that it deemed consequential and material to be defects requiring
strict compliance.
The court determined that submission of an insurance
covernote bearing the number 4291 instead of the correct number
429711 while possibly "immaterial on its face," under precedent
was non-conforming. 8 The absence of "Ltd." from the payee's
50. Id. at 1539.
51. It should be noted the district court did not adopt a situational strict/substantial
compliance standard. It did imply that it might in the future. The Second Circuit based its
affirmance on other grounds and refrained from discussing the advisability of adopting sub-
stantial compliance or situational standards. Cochin, 808 F.2d at 211. This avoidance, while
proper, leaves the district court free, and apparently inclined, to adopt a situational stan-
dard in an appropriate case.
52. Id. at 1540-41.
53. Id. at 1540. The district court cites Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 762 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1985) as authority for the proposition that "immaterial" or "inconsequential" mistakes in a
document may be considered as complying with a credit's terms. The Beyene court did not
hold that minor mistakes may be found to comply. It, as an aside, said that in "a case where
[a] name intended [on a bill of lading] is unmistakably clear despite what is obviously a
typographical error," Id. at 6, there might be grounds for a different result. It did hold that
a bank's duty to honor a draft does not arise "unless the terms of the letter have been
complied with strictly." Id. Thus, while the Beyene dicta is troubling, and given liberal
construction is capable of being support for derogation of the strict compliance rule, it is not
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name was termed a defect because "it is not clear that the 'in-
tended' party was paid. The difference in names could also possi-
bly be an indicia of unreliability or forgery.)M4
The expressly stated terms of the letter of credit are unavail-
ing to the customer unless the court can agree that the customer
had a valid reason for requesting the conformity: the insurance
coverage depends on the correct number, or, the intended payee
may be not be paid if "Ltd." is deleted from the draft. This
method of going behind the required documents is forcefully high-
lighted by the district court's rejection of a term requiring six cop-
ies of the commercial invoice." The five copies sent were similar,
in the court's view, to spelling "Smith" as "Smithh."' 6 The court
does not compare apples to oranges, both fruits; but instead com-
pares apples and computers."' Thus, Smithh equals Smith as 5
equals 6. Everyone knows who, in context, "Smithh" is, as every-
one knows that "5 equals 6." Such reasoning does nothing to pre-
serve the certainty and stability needed in letter of credit law. By
this logic, the required number of copies of a document is the same
as the spelling of a common name. It is then permissible to con-
clude that the "deviations" -Smithh/Smith and 5/6-were simi-
lar, "not affecting strict compliance [as] [tihese types of variances
may be allowable 'if there is no possibility that the documents
could mislead the paying bank to its detriment.' "58 Cochin is not
a basis for the great expansionary construction applied by the Cochin district court.
54. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541. It should be kept in mind that this case is decided on
motions for summary judgment. The court's inquiry into the customer's intent in choice of
names is troubling.
55. The Second Circuit accepts the district court's misanalysis without comment.
Cochin, 808 F.2d at 211, n. I and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Apple Computer has had some trouble in the past coping with grey-market knock-
offs of its products. The copies were marketed under the names of various fruits.
58. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541. The district court is quoting from a footnote in
Beyene v. Irving Trust Co., 596 F. Supp. 438, 442 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1985) which quotes from Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants National
Bank, 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978). The district court deletes emphasis from the word "no"
found in both Flagship and Beyene and ignores the Beyene court's placement of the burden
of proof on the party-here MHT-claiming that the error did not mislead the issuing
bank. The analysis and wisdom of the Flagship decision aside, it is inappropriate authority.
The Beyene court cited it as an incorrect standard: "Even if a compliance rule of arguably
greater liberality applied ..." going on to quote and dismiss the Flagship rationale.
Beyene, 596 F. Supp. at 442 n.8. The Second Circuit in affirming the district court Beyene
decision flatly stated that the duty to pay the amount of the credit "does not arise unless
the terms of the letter have been complied with strictly." Beyene, 762 F.2d at 6. Even were
the Flagship rationale an appropriate rule, MHT should not prevail. The missing commer-
cial invoice copy is not something that misleads like a misspelling. Were it capable of mis-
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misled. The issuing bank, and the customer are deprived of what
they engaged the confirming bank to procure, the documents re-
quested, as strictly construed, or a remedy for the confirming
bank's wrongful honor."
Absent strict compliance, a customer, through the issuing
bank, has no certain way of obtaining the documents it wants. The
district court is not willing to accept what the customer wants.
There is no strict compliance standard unless Cochin is mislead by
the absence of the invoice-unless the district court agrees that
Cochin had a good reason for demanding the invoice. In hindsight,
the district court must concur that the want is a material, essential
need, deserving of application of the strict compliance standard.60
Multiple layers of unreality are at work. Just as the customer
may not have had a reason, or a "good" reason, for requiring six
copies of the commercial invoice, the confirming bank or the bene-
ficiary probably did not decide that five copies were sufficient. Five
copies, without thought, were probably sent."1 Such defects are not
important unless a deal goes bad. At that point there is a scramble
to avoid the consequences. When a court acts to assign the conse-
quences to the party who in a normal commercial context was less
culpable, by examining the commercial validity of requiring a cer-
tain reference number, an exact name, or an exact number of cop-
ies, it masks what is occurring. Thus, the district court claims to be
analyzing under a strict compliance standard, but abandons refer-
ence to the ministerial role of the bank, judging the bank's conduct
by whether the customer's and beneficiary's acts were justified in
the context of the underlying transaction, under circumstances
where the motivations of the parties are completely divorced from
leading, MHT presented no evidence to show that there was "no possibility that the [miss-
ing invoice] could mislead [Cochin]." Flagship, 569 F.2d at 705.
59.
The reason underlying the rule that the bank is to act only on the basis of the
documents submitted is that the value of a letter of credit lies in the fact that
the banks, which handle the letter of credit, act in a purely ministerial capacity
and can determine with relative ease whether payment to the beneficiary should
be made. If a bank were required to conduct an investigation of the circum-
stances underlying the transaction before making a decision as to whether to
honor the credit, the system would become so expensive and cumbersome that it
would be virtually useless.
Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 143-44.
60. See Rubenstein, supra note 22.
61. There were 160 pages of documents submitted to support ten presented drafts.
Brief for Appellant at 6, Cochin, 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the normal motivations fueling a commercial transaction."
A rule of law must work whenever it is applied. The same rule
that governs a confirming bank's failure to procure universally rec-
ognized commercially necessary documents, must work when the
confirming bank fails to obtain documents that in hindsight seem
to have no, or a petty purpose. The district court gratuitously said
that "If Vishwa or Cochin wanted additional protection, they could
have requested it and so informed MHT. ' 3 Three paragraphs
later it denied the request (note that this request is, in the court's
view, not a "requirement" under the letter of credit) for six copies
of the commercial invoice."4
Whether a rule works must be judged by its purpose. The dis-
trict court states that the purpose of the rule it applies to the case
is to ensure "the letter of credit's function of being a swift, fluid
and reliable financing device."6 It is difficult to see the district
court's "quasi-strict" compliance rule, as reliable from anyone's
point of view. MHT deleted "Ltd." and lost. It deleted one of six
copies and won. Cochin relied on the phrase, "St. Lucia Enter-
prises, Ltd.," and won. It relied on the word six and lost. The "reli-
ability" of the rule led to a "swift" determination of the party's
rights five years after presentation of the draft and documents.
The course of the dispute might be described as "fluid" if the
twists and turns of the district court's analysis were not so abrupt.
The Second Circuit, as previously noted, accepted without
comment the district court's determination that there were only
two non-conformities in the documents taken in by MHT. This ab-
stention, hopefully, is not a sign of retreat from the strict compli-
ance standard; but rather, an instance where discussion was not
62.
It is the complete separation between the underlying commercial transac-
tion and the letter of credit that gives the letter its utility in financing transac-
tions. The parties to the commercial contract bring in a third party-the
bank-to finance the transaction for them. The bank's sole function is the fi-
nancing; it is not concerned with or involved in the commercial transaction. This
restriction simplifies the bank's role and enables it to act quickly and surely.
Because the bank is not involved in the commercial transaction, however, all its
rights and duties are set out in and defined by the letter of credit. The bank is
not expected or required to be familiar with or to consider the customs of, or the
special meaning or effect given to particular terms in, the trade.
Marino Industries v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 686 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1982).
63. Cochin, at 1541.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1543.
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necessary to the Second Circuit's resolution of the appeal.
This case was heard in the federal courts on a diversity basis,
requiring application of New York law. 6 The New York Court of
Appeals recently reaffirmed its adherence to the strict compliance
standard in United Commodities-Greece v. Fidelity International
Bank, stating the rule to be "justified in the bank's role in the
transaction [as] being ministerial . .. to require it to determine
the substantiality of discrepancies would be inconsistent with its
function. Strict compliance means that 'the papers, documents and
shipping directions must be followed as stated in the letter.' )987
B. Duty to "Cure"
The district court next examined the dealings between Cochin
and MHT in terms of what it called estoppel 8 Estoppel, as de-
fined by the district court, applies when an issuing bank is charged
with "discoverable district nonconformities that could have been
cured by the beneficiary before the expiration of the letter." 9 The
estoppel results from "previous assurances to the beneficiary of
documentary compliance" 0 or retention of the documents, with si-
lence as to the non-conformity for an unreasonably long period of
time after presentation.7 1 Estoppel, as traditionally defined, as
used by New York courts, and as implied by the district court's
definition, requires detrimental reliance by the party asserting its
application.7 The district court's deletion of the reliance element
is immaterial because after stating what estoppel is, the court ig-
nored the rule and applied an amalgam of U.C.P. and U.C.C. letter
of credit provisions with overtones of sales and negotiable instru-
ment law, leavened with an issuing bank's affirmative duty, appar-
ently derived from a law review comment.7 1
66. See infra note 102. Reference to New York law might lead to the use of Indian law.
67. 64 N.Y.2d 449, 456, 478 N.E.2d 172, 174, 489 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (1985) (citations
omitted).
68. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541-43. The court defines waiver in the letter of credit
context, but the concept is not applicable to, or used with, the facts at issue. The court
substitutes a combined U.C.P., U.C.C. waiver analysis, discussed infra.
69. Id. at 1541.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 648 (4th ed. 1968); United Commodities-Greece v. Fidelity
International Bank, 64 N.Y.2d 449, 457, 478 N.E.2d 172, 175, 489 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (1985)
("To take advantage of estoppel, [MHT] would have to prove that it relied to its detriment
on a misleading representation of [Cochin].").
73. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541-43.
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The court cites U.C.P. 1974, Article 8(c) 74 for the rule that an
issuing bank must "immediately notify the beneficiary by 'expedi-
tious means' of any reason for non-compliance and [of] the physi-
cal disposition of the disputed documents. ' 'T 6 As examination of
Article 8 set forth in note 74 indicates, the U.C.P. does not require
immediate notice; rather, it requires "notice without delay.' 1"7  Fur-
ther, that notice is only required after the "issuing bank [has had]
a reasonable time to examine the documents."' "7 The International
Commerce Commission Banking Commission (I.C.C.), in deciding
whether a confirming bank was entitled to interest while the issu-
ing bank delays reimbursement, stated that "each case would need
to be considered on its merits to decide whether there had been
delay. . . the main problem was deciding what was meant by de-
74. Article 8 states:
(a) In documentary credit operations all parties concerned deal in documents
and not in goods.
(b) Payment, acceptance or negotation against documents which appear on their
face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of a credit by a bank
authorized to do so, binds the party giving the authorization to take up the doc-
uments and reimburse the bank which has effected the payment, acceptance or
negotiation.
(c) If, upon receipt of the documents, the issuing bank considers that they ap-
pear on their face not to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
credit, that bank must determine, on the basis of the documents alone, whether
to claim that payment, acceptance or negotiation was not effected in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the credit.
(d) The issuing bank shall have a reasonable time to examine the documents and
to determine as above whether to make such a claim.
(e) If such claim is to be made, notice to that effect, stating the reasons therefor,
must without delay, be given by cable or other expeditious means to the bank
from which the documents have been received (the remitting bank) and such
notice must state that the documents are being held at the disposal of such bank
or are being returned thereto.
(f) If the issuing bank fails to hold the documents at the disposal of the remit-
ting bank, or fails to return the documents to such bank, the issuing bank shall
be precluded from claiming that the relative payment, acceptance or negotiation
was not effected in accordance with terms and conditions of the credit.
(g) If the remitting bank draws the attention of the issuing bank to any irregu-
larities in the documents or advises such bank that it has paid, accepted or nego-
tiated under reserve or against a guarantee in respect of such irregularities, the
issuing bank shall not thereby be relieved from any of its obligations under this
article. Such guarantee or reserve concerns only the relations between the remit-
ting bank and the beneficiary.
U.C.P. article 8 (1974).
Article 8 was revised and renumbered as 16 in the 1983 version of the U.C.P. The provi-
sions pertinent to the issues discussed have not changed so as to effect the outcome.
75. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541-1542.
76. U.C.P. 8(e).
77. U.C.P. 8(d).
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lay." The Commission resolved that delay was to be determined by
examination of practice of the bank. 8 The I.C.C., author of the
U.C.P., did not equate "without delay" to "immediate"; but rather
indicated that delay is to be determined on a factual record.79
The district court introduced the idea of cure by reference to a
student law review comment.80 The Comment recommends that
the U.C.C. incorporate the U.C.P. 1974, Article 8 notice provision
so that non-conforming presentations before expiration of the
credit can be cured by correction and re-presentation.1 The Com-
ment goes on to propose that a customer have a "good faith waiver
duty" even when the credit has expired." The district court went
one step better.
MHT advised its confirmation of the credit to St. Lucia, the
beneficiary, including the wrong insurance number and the mis-
statement of the beneficiary's name. Cochin received a copy.3 The
district court took the Comment's proposal, applicable where an
issuing bank receives non-conforming documents that are required
on presentation, and created an affirmative duty that the issuing
bank review copies of correspondence from the confirming bank to
the beneficiary to ensure that the confirming bank has not acted
negligently.84
There is more than a semantic problem with holding that
Cochin has a duty to "cure" MHT's mistake.8 5 Instead of a duty to
notify the confirming bank, and thus the beneficiary, of non-con-
formities where the beneficiary can resubmit conforming docu-
ments, curing the defect, the district court required that Cochin,
effectively, supervise MHT's actions during the term of the credit.
78. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DECISIONS (1975-1979) OF THE ICC BANKING
COMsMSSbON ON QUEms RELATING TO UNIFORM CUSTO MS AND PRACTICE FOR DOcuaEN AsRY
Cwnrrs (1980) [hereinafter DECISIONS]. While published in 1980, and dealing with the years
1975-79, the decisions refer to the U.C.P. 1974.
79. It should be noted that the U.C.P. is not binding on courts. DECISIONS acknowledges
this by stating the caveat "[this book is] intended as [a guideline] for all interested parties
in documentary credit operations but has no legally-binding effect on these parties." DECI-
SIONS, supra note 78, overleaf. Part of the basis of the district court's opinion is derived
from the U.C.P. duty to advise of the reason for rejection of documents. Thus, it would
seem that I.C.C. interpretations would be persuasive.
80. Comment, Letters of Credit: A Solution to the Problem of Documentary Compli-
ance 50 FORDHAm L. REv. 848, 870-74 (1982).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 874-75.
83. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1535 n.5.
84. Id. at 1542.
85. Id.
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Where Cochin does not meet the tort standard of care under its
"affirmative obligation" it "is precluded from claiming wrongful
honor.""0
There is no dispute that MHT erred in its advices to St. Lu-
cia. The district court charged Cochin with notice and created a
duty to correct MHT's apparently negligent error. The I.C.C.
Banking Commission stated that "Article 12 established a princi-
ple according to which the issuing bank was exonerated from all
liability for the errors of the advising bank [except] where the issu-
ing bank had been guilty of negligence."' 7 A negligence standard
dovetails nicely with the basis for estoppel's detrimental reliance
element-breach of duty without causation or damage is not ac-
tionable. Negligence by a bank respecting its duty to others is
treated by the U.C.C. as a failure to exercise "ordinary care."88
Even if Cochin should have a duty to supervise the performance of
MHT's duty under the credit, as a confirming bank, whether
Cochin breached that duty is a fact question for a jury, not a ques-
tion of law susceptible to summary judgment. Breach must be de-
termined on the facts surrounding its examination. The facts did
not appear before the district court."'
Again, as previously noted, the Second Circuit grounded its
decision on other bases and did not comment on the district
court's novel creation of an ongoing affirmative duty to supervise a
confirming bank's performance of its duties under a letter of
credit. Again, this approach allows the district court's analysis to
survive as dicta.
C. "'Reasonable Delay"
Both the district court and the Second Circuit find that
Cochin's claim is barred by several separate versions of waiver, es-
86. Id.
87. DEcisioNs, supra note 78, at 30. U.C.P. 1974 Article 12 deals with the liability of an
issuing bank to its customer for negligence by an advising or a confirming bank. There does
not appear to be any policy basis to reject the negligence standard when the issuing bank is
the plaintiff suing the confirming bank rather than the defendant being sued by the cus-
tomer for derivative liability based on the negligence of the confirming bank.
88, U.C.C. art. 4.
89. This suit was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment on a record that
included the letter of credit, the documents presented, and various depositions dealing with
Cochin's and MHT's actions during the time period surrounding the presentation of the
drafts and documents. There is no evidence about the circumstances in which Cochin re-
ceived and processed the advice copies.
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toppel, U.C.P. rules, and what is termed "preclusion" analysis.'
Each court's analysis will be discussed separately.
1. The District Court
The district court found Cochin to be "precluded from claim-
ing wrongful honor because of its failure to comply with the ex-
plicit notice and affirmative obligation provisions of the U.C.P."'
The district court determined that Cochin unreasonably delayed
asserting the defects in the documents. As previously noted, the
I.C.C. Commission considers "what is delay" to be a fact question.
The district court reasoned that since the terms "reasonable time"
and "without delay" are not defined, the U.C.P. provision is am-
biguous, allowing incorporation of U.C.C. § 5-112 (1)(a). Phrases
like "reasonable time" and "without delay" usually are not labelled
ambiguous as that term is used in a legal context; but, rather are
taken to invite factual interpretation. Traditionally, ambiguity is
either latent, where the words are clear but can be rationally inter-
preted variously in light of extrinsic evidence, or patent, where the
words are not capable of understanding.9 Neither definition fits
the U.C.P. language.9 4
The district court has used "ambiguity" to make a value judg-
ment, substituting a concrete rule for examination of facts. The
U.C.C. rule allows a bank to delay honor of a draft and documents
"until the close of the third banking day following receipt of the
documents." 5 The district court applied the provision, reasoning
that since Cochin received the documents on a Saturday, June 21
(skipping Sunday the 22nd), Wednesday, the 26th, was the third,
and last day that Cochin could convey non-conformities." Cochin
advised of the non-conforming insurance covernote on June 27, a
day late and $798,000 short.
There are several problems with the court's application of Sec-
tion 5-112 (1)(a).97 There is no evidence that Cochin received the
90. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1541-43; Cochin, 808 F.2d at 211-13.
91. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1542.
92. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 1 (1978).
93. BLACK'S LAW DicTioNA Y 105 (4th ed. 1968).
94. Supra note 74.
95. U.C.C. § 5-112 (1)(a).
96. Cochin, 612 F. Supp. at 1543.
97. The effect of district court's analysis on the parties is obviated by the subsequent
agreement of the parties that the incorrect insurance covernote number was actually
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documents while open for business on Saturday. Section 4-107 of
the U.C.C. provides:
(1) For the purpose of allowing time to process items, prove bal-
ances and make the necessary entries on its books to determine
its position for the day, a bank may fix an afternoon hour of 2
p.m. or later as a cut-off hour for the handling of money and
items and the making of entries on its books.
(2) Any item or deposit of money received on any day after a
cut-off hour so fixed or after the close of the banking day may
be treated as being received as of the opening of the next bank-
ing day."8
Section 4-104 of the U.C.C. states: "(1) . .. (c) 'Banking day'
means that part of any day on which a bank is open to the public
for carrying on substantially all of its banking functions.""
It is possible with various assumptions, that the three day pe-
riod could end on June 27. Again, the issue is hardly resolvable on
summary judgment.100 The district court, in evading the U.C.P.'s
factual questions as to what constitutes "reasonable time" and
"without delay," was confronted with, and ignored, factual ques-
tions concerning whether Cochin advised of the absence of "Ltd"
from the payee's name on the draft within the adopted U.C.C. time
period.101
2. The Second Circuit
As already noted, the Second Circuit decided Cochin's appeal
without determining whether substantial or strict compliance
should have been used as a standard;102 whether an issuing bank
should have a duty to oversee the performance of a confirming
Cochin's fault. The wrong number was originally mistakenly transmitted to MHT. Cochin,
808 F.2d at 211 n.1. The analysis, however, still remains in the opinion available for use in
later suits. Again, the Second Circuit did not address the issue, as it was not pertinent to
resolution of the revised dispute.
98. U.C.C. S 4-107 (1978).
99. U.C.C. § 4-104 (1978).
100. The record on which the court decided the case does not include information on
Cochin's closing time and when the documents were received on Saturday, the 21st.
101. The district court rejects use of Indian law to determine the "ambiguous" phrases,
using New York's comparative interest choice of law approach to apply the U.C.C. U.C.C. §
4-102(2) (1978) requires that the liability of a bank for its acts "for purposes of present-
ment, payment or collection is governed by the law of the place where the bank is located,"
here India. Renvoi resolution is not dealt with by the court.
102. See supra Part III (A).
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bank and "cure" its mistakes; 3 and whether the U.C.C. § 5-112
three day rule should be engrafted to interpret U.C.P. Article 8's
"reasonable time" and "without delay."'' 0 The Second Circuit in-
stead focused on U.C.P. Article 8 and ignored the allowance of a
"reasonable time to examine the documents" found in subsection
(d). The court apparently decided as a matter of law that Cochin's
notice of discrepancies and advise of disposition of the documents
were unjustifiably delayed. "Cochin's delay in specifying the de-
fects estopped it from asserting that the documents did not comply
with the letter of credit, and [it's] two-week delay in notifying
MHT of it's intent to return the documents precludes this suit.
10 5
The court's phrasing of its holding makes it unclear whether
the two standards Cochin is found to have breached are indepen-
dently sufficient to first "estop" it and then further, "preclude" its
suit. Precision aside, the Second Circuit is wrong. Like the district
court, the Second Circuit does not seem to be concerned with ana-
lyzing the elements of estoppel; indeed, it does not seem to be con-
cerned with New York case law, or with its own prior decisions.
New York requires that a party prove detrimental reliance to
assert estoppel.0 6 In Marino Industries Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,10 7 the Second Circuit recognized the factual predicate for
the legal estoppel defense. There the Second Circuit remanded for
determination of whether a one-and-one-half month delay in re-
turning documents after initial inspection and discovery of defects
was an unreasonable time to examine the documentation under the
terms of U.C.P. Article 8. The Marino court there noted that the
bank's prompt return of the documents would have allowed the
beneficiary to correct and resubmit within the term of the credit."8
Implicit in the common law estoppel and U.C.P. "reasonable time"
analysis is the requirement that the confirming bank or beneficiary
be harmed by the issuing bank's retention of the documents during
the term of the credit. The legal bromide-the law does not re-
quire a useless act-comes to mind.
MHT was informed of the existence of defects asserted by
Cochin immediately upon Cochin's receipt of the documents, but
103. See supra Part III (B).
104. See supra Part III (C).
105. Cochin, 808 F.2d at 213.
106. United Commodities, 64 N.Y.2d 449, 478 N.E.2d 172, 489 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1985).
107. 686 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1982).
108. Marino, 686 F.2d at 118.
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even at that time MHT had paid the absconding beneficiary.109
MHT was not harmed by Cochin's retention of the documents.
The Second Circuit quotes from Harfield to the effect that the is-
suing bank cannot use the "reasonable time" allowance to "ride
the market."110 Cochin was hardly riding the market. It advised of
defects and continued to identify them over the two-week period
that the Second Circuit decries. MHT could not have cured the
situation within the period of the credit.
The Second Circuit fell into the same trap entered by the dis-
trict court-treating what is reasonable time as a question of law,
susceptible to resolution on motions for summary judgment.111 The
Second Circuit concluded its analysis by incorrectly stating that,
had Cochin quickly notified MHT of the claimed defects, some or
all of the funds might have been recovered. It then held Cochin to
be culpable for failing to take advantage of the opportunities avail-
able to prevent MHT's negligence from resulting in loss.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit affirmed with minimal comment, leaving
the district court's analysis as precedent. It did not reach the dis-
trict court's alternative duty of "cure" analysis which thus survives
with some validity as dicta. Further, the Second Circuit did not
deal with the "quasi-strict" compliance analysis. This leaves the
district court's analysis as dicta to be applied to bank-beneficiary
suits. The Second Circuit while inappropriately deciding fact ques-
tions without the benefit of appropriate evidence, does most of its
damage to Cochin individually. It is hoped that when the district
court's various hybrid analyses re-emerge in future cases that the
Second Circuit will take the time to disavow and reject them.
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
are very important courts; the business and banking communities,
as well as other courts, closely watch their commercial cases. Bank
of Cochin, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, in both the dis-
trict court and in the Second Circuit, however it is interpreted by
109. Joint Appendix to Briefs of Parties at A-161, Bank of Cochin Ltd. v. Manufactur-
ers Hanover Trust Co., 808 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1986). St. Lucia Enterprise's Citibank account
statement indicates that they deposited $798,000.00 on June 17. They withdrew $756,673.50
by check paid on June 23. MHT's telex was dated the same day. Id. at A-156.
110. H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES 232 (5th ed. 1974).
111. See supra Part III (C)(1).
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other courts, can do little to stabilize letter of credit law for banks
and businessmen.
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